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Rapid improvement in the living standards of Taiwan and South Korea during the
recent decades is a familiar story. The economic development of the two countries in
the first half of the 20th century is less known, however. Taiwan became a colony of
Japan in 1895, and Korea in 1910. Using national income statistics, we argue that the
Japanese colonial rule not only initiated the transition to modern economic growth,
but also had lasting influence upon the post-colonial growth in Taiwan and South
Korea.
In order to understand the economic transformation of the two economies, we
study the development policies of the Japanese colonial government. In discussing
Korean development, we have taken advantage of the data availability to do growth
accounting analysis. We identify key factors driving Korea out of secular stagna-
tion and initiating the sustained growth. In the case of Taiwan, we compare the
self-strengthening reform movement of late Ch’ing and the Japanese development
policies, and try to identify the most important factors to development.
In the following, we discuss the development of the two countires sequentially.
Sections 1 to 4 are devoted to Taiwan, and 5 to 7 are to Korea. Some concluding
remarks are given in section 8.
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1 Taiwan Before 1900
From the early 17th century to 1895, Taiwan was first ruled by the Dutch (1624–62),
then by the Cheng regime (1662–1683), which was followed by the Ch’ing empire
(1683–1895). In the early 17th century, Ming China restricted foreign trade. Never-
theless, smuggling and pirates flourished in the South China Sea, where Japanese and
Chinese traded commodities produced in China, Japan, and Manila. Located along
the international trade route, Taiwan was a convenientmeeting place for Japanese and
Chinese traders.1
When the Dutch East India Company came to the East, the primary aim was to
trade with China. After repeated rejections by Ming China, the Dutch finally set-
tled in southern Taiwan in 1624. During this time, there were some Chinese and
Japanese staying on the coast, but the island was inhabited mainly by aborigines. The
residents of Taiwan engaged in fishing, hunting, and trading. Agricultural activities
were limited. In the beginning, the Dutch regarded Taiwan as an entrepoˆt, but they
soon realized that Taiwan could produce various tradeable goods that would gener-
ate profits. Among the goods produced in Taiwan, and exported by the Dutch, deer
hide and sugar were the most important.2 Taiwan is a small island economy of only
36,000 square kilometers, and has relatively little natural resources. Foreign trade is
important not only to satisfy domestic needs and but also for economic growth.
The Dutch was defeated by Cheng Ch’eng-kung in 1661. The Cheng’s regime was
short-lived and was soon succeeded by the Ch’ing government in 1683. In 1685, the
Ch’ing government eased restrictions on foreign trade, foreigners were now allowed
to trade with the Chinese, but only via Amoy, which was located in the south eastern
part of China not far way from Taiwan. Because of the policy change, Taiwan’s role as
an entrepoˆt for Chinese foreign trade changed immediately.3 For most of the Ch’ing
years, Taiwan was only a small part of the Chinese economy. There were reports that
1See Ts’ao (2000), p. 20 and Wills (1999), pp. 86–7.
2During the years 1633–60, Taiwan’s annual export of deer hide averaged 71,915 pieces. The max-
imum was reached in 1638, in which 151,980 pieces of hide were exported. Taiwan’s sugar export
to Japan increased from 99,600 kilograms in 1635 to 392,411 kilograms in 1658, see Nagaseki (1999,
p. 51). Sugar export to Persia was 112,800 kilogram in 1639, and 480,000 kilograms in 1658, see Iwao
(1955).
3See Ts’ao (2001).
2
large amount of rice and sugar were exported to China, but except for the last thirty
years of the Ch’ing rule, no reliable data were available for detailed analysis.
The Manchu government imposed restrictions on emigration to Taiwan in the
early days. The restrictions were enforced on and off for some time, but were lifted in
the mid-1830s. Taiwan’s population and cultivated land area increased accordingly.
It is unfortunate that little quantitative data are available for understanding Taiwan’s
economic development during the Ch’ing period. Even the official population count
and cultivated land area data are unreliable. Following the detailed analysis of Shep-
herd (1993, pp. 137–76), and using 1684 and 1905 as the terminal years, Taiwan’s av-
erage annual population growth rate was 1.31%, and the cultivated land area growth
rate was 1.25%. Taiwan’s population growth rate wasmuch higher than in China dur-
ing the same period, reflecting the fact that Taiwan’s population increase was a result
of immigration from China.4 If agricultural technology remained constant, then the
growth rate of the cultivated land area being smaller than population growth implied
that per capita output was decreasing. It has been argued, however, that there was
improvement in agricultural technology.5
During the Ch’ing era, the government did not actively involved in economic
development. For example, almost all the irrigation systems were constructed, main-
tained andmanaged by the private sector. This is in contrast to the Korean case. After
1895, the Japanese colonial government, however, regarded irrigation system as an
important public affair, and heavily financed the constructions of many irrigation
systems. The biggest project was the Chia-Nan Reservoir system constructed during
1920s and early 1930s. The system greatly increased the agricultural productivity in
the irrigation area.
In early 1860s, Keelung in the north of Taiwan and Kaoshiung in the south were
opened for international trade. Again, for the first time since the late 17th century,
Taiwan’s products entered international markets, and foreign trade brought oppor-
tunity for growth. Toward the end of the Ch’ing rule, the most valuable export was
4Using the data compiled by Maddison (1998), p. 158, China’s average population growth rate in
1820–1913 was 0.15%.
5See, for example, Myers (1972). Wang (1994, p. 119) argued, however, that the agricultural devel-
opment during the Ch’ing era was mainly in the increase in the cultivated land area.
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tea, followed by sugar. Tea was grown in the mountain of northern Taiwan, while
sugarcane was planted in the plains of the south. Taiwan exported 82 tons of tea in
1865. Thirty years later, tea export had increased to 8,210 tons in 1894. In contrast,
sugar export was 35,847 tons in 1879, and 44,134 tons in 1894. Tea was sold at a
higher price than sugar. The flourishing of the tea industry attracted labor and capi-
tal from outside Taiwan. Before Taiwan was opened for trade, most of the land in the
north was used to grow rice, which used to be an important export to China. After
the boom in the tea industry, some lands was switched to growing tea, and northern
Taiwan sometimes had to import rice instead.6
It has been argued that open to foreign trade might have enhanced Taiwan’s eco-
nomic development, but the evidence is hard to find. In 1887, recognizing its strategic
position, Taiwan was declared by the Ch’ing government as an independent province.
The first governor, Liu Ming-chuan, had actively pursued a self-strengthening pro-
gram. Among the reform efforts, a railway was constructed in northern Taiwan. But
in general, the economic effects of the self-strengthening program were limited.7
2 Income and Distribution
2.1 Change in GDP Level and Growth Rate
There have been several estimates on Taiwan’s national income during the colonial
period. Among them, Wu (1991) covers the period of 1910–50. Unfortunately, the
method used in the estimation of real GDP has some problems. The data used in this
study are compiled from a newGDP estimate for 1937–50, and an indirect GDP index
for 1903–36, which is based on revised estimates on agricultural production and the
value-added of sugar industry.
Figure 1 compares per capita GDP of Taiwan, China, and Japan. In 1905–40,
average growth rate of per capita GDP was 1.89% for Taiwan, and 2.07% for Japan.
Maddison (2001) compiles world’s long-termGDP estimates, fromwhich growth rate
for 1913–50 can be calculated. For the 1913–50 period, growth of per capita GDP
was 0.91% for the whole world, and 1.55% for the Western Offshoots (Maddison,
6See Wang (1994), pp. 115–6. See also the discussion in Gardella (1994), p. 75.
7See Davidson (1903). pp. 170–256, for a description on Taiwan in late Ch’ing.
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Figure 1: Per Capita GDP of Taiwan, China, and Japan
Source: Japan, from Maddison (2001) and GGDC data set: http://
www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/homeggdc.html. China, 1950–98, GGDC
data set; before 1950, the estimates of 1913, 1933, and 1938 are from Mad-
dison (1998). Taiwan: First use GGDC data for 1951–99, the series is then
linked to the estimate of Kuo et al. (1997) for 1937–50. In order to link
to the 1903–36 period, we use an indirect GDP index by summing up the
agricultural output in Wu (2001) and the value-added of sugar in Koo and
Wu (2001). We then divide GDP by population to get the per capita GDP.
2001, p. 126). The period covers World War II, during which national income of
many countries, including Taiwan, China, and Japan, were severely affected by war.
Taiwan’s average growth rate for 1913–50 was 1.41%. The data suggests that Taiwan’s
economic growth during the Japanese colonial period was quite robust comparing
with the rest of the world.
Table 1 shows per capita GDP of Taiwan, China, and Japan for some years. Ac-
cording to this estimate, Taiwan’s per capita GDP in 1903 was 560 dollars (in 1990
U.S. dollars), slightly lower higher than China’s 547 dollars. To have a better under-
standing of Taiwan’s economic growth during the Japanese colonial era, we need to
know the economic performance during the Ch’ing rule. Unfortunately, given the
data available, a direct estimate of Taiwan’s national income level or growth rate dur-
ing the Ch’ing dynasty is impossible. Nevertheless, an indirect estimate can be made
following the ingenious method of Pritchett (1997).
Pritchett argues that the minimal subsistence level in any society is about 250
dollars in the unit of 1985 U.S. currency. This is equivalent to 297 dollars in 1990
U.S. dollars. In the beginning of the Ch’ing rule, Taiwan’s population was small, and
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Table 1: Per Capita GDP
1890 1903 1913 1933 1938
Taiwan – 560 701 1175 1236
China 540 547 552 578 589
Japan 1012 1193 1385 2122 2449
Unit: 1990 U.S. dollars.
Source: See Figure 1.
so was the cultivated land. If we assume that in 1683 per capita GDP was 350 dollars,
then with the per capita GDP in 1903 estimated to be 560 dollars, average growth rate
was 0.21%. If per capita GDP in 1683 was assumed to be higher than 350 dollars,
growth rate would be lower than 0.21%. Both of the numbers are much lower than
the growth rate during the Japanese period.
Alternatively, it might be that before Taiwan was open to foreign trade in early
1860s, growth rate was near zero. And from 1860 to 1903, per capita GDP grew from
350 to 560 dollars. As discussed above, given what was known about the economic
situation during the time, this seemed to be unlikely. However, even though this
was what had happened, per capita GDP growth rate in late Ch’ing would be 1.1%,
still much lower than the growth rate in 1905–40. The above analysis suggests that
the Japanese administration had transformed a traditional stagnant economy into a
growing economy. And this was accomplished within a relatively short period of time.
2.2 Life Expectancy
It is recognized that due to data problem, Taiwan’s national income estimate in the
early 20th century might be subject to large errors. So it is better to double-check the
reliability of the national income estimate with other statistics. As a supplement to
the national income estimate, we can look at life expectancy and body height data.
Table 2 compares life expectancy at birth of Taiwan, Japan, and China. Taiwanese life
expectancy was 27.7 years for male in 1906. It increased to 34.5 years in 1921, 38.8
years in 1926–30, and 41.1 years in 1936–40.8 In contrast, Chinese life expectancy
for male in rural area was only 24.6 years in 1929–31. Japanese life expectancy has
8For a survey of Taiwan’s demographic changes during the colonial period, see Chen (1979).
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Table 2: Life Expectancy At Birth
sex 1906 1921 1926–30 1936–40 1956
Taiwan male 27.7 34.5 38.8 41.1 60.2
female 29.0 38.6 43.1 45.7 64.2
China male – – 24.6* – 46.1
female – – 23.7* – 48.1
Japan** male – 42.1 44.8 46.9 62.8
female – 43.2 46.5 49.6 66.8
Note: * These figures are constructed from a survey in agricultural vil-
lages during 1929–31. ** For Japan, figures of 1921 were constructed
from 1920–25 statistics; 1926–30 from 1925–30 statistics; 1936–40
from 1935–36 statistics; 1956 from 1954–55 statistics.
Sources: Taiwan: Barclay (1954, p. 154) and Chen (1979), p. 165;
China: Banister (1987, pp. 6, 116); Japan: Taeuber (1958, p. 288).
already exceeded 40 years in 1919.
According to Maddison (2001, pp. 29–31), the lowest life expectancy at birth on
record was 24.0 in Roman Egypt, during 33–258. Life expectancy was 24.3 years in
England, 1301–1425, and 24.8 years in France, 1740–49. These statistics suggest that
the lowest life expectancy in any society was about 24 years. We thus conjecture that
Taiwan’s life expectancy during the Ch’ing rule was about 25 years. And with the
Japanese administration, life expectancy began to increase. Together with the increase
in life expectancy, mortality rate steadily declined during the Japanese period. In
1906, Taiwanese mortality rate was 3.47%. It decreased to 33.3% in 1920, 25.2% in
1925, 19.9% in 1930, and 20.4% in 1940.9
Finally, a recent study on Taiwanese body height also indicated that an economic
structure change had occurred when Japan began to rule in Taiwan. Olds (2000)
shows that Taiwanese body height born after 1895 was significantly higher than those
born in late Ch’ing. More explicitly, “the average male born between 1908 and 1910
grew to be 2.62 centimeters taller than the average male born in the period 1887–
1889.” The same phenomenon had occurred to female. Both the life expectancy data
and the study on body hight are consistent with the national income statistics.
9See Chen (1979), p. 155.
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2.3 IncomeDistribution
The discussion so far is on per capita GDP and growth. Another question receiving
great attention is the income distribution between Taiwanese and Japanese during the
Japanese era. It has been shown above that Taiwan’s per capita GDP growth rate was
significantly higher since 1895. This does not necessarily imply, however, that per
capita income of the Taiwanese obtained the same high growth rate. Some previous
studies, such asHo (1978, 1984), had argued that the Taiwanese people did not benefit
much from the economic development, especially before the end of 1920s. We need
to know income distribution between Japanese andTaiwanese to answer the question.
Some studies had tried to estimate Taiwanese per capita real consumption, real
wage, and food availability in calories during the colonial period.10 There are some
difficulties with these approaches. One difficulty, for example, is that the nominal
wage sample data usually are not comprehensive enough to generate a good statistics
to represent the whole labor force. Nevertheless, it is still possible to construct time
series statistics of real wage for Taiwanese workers. During the colonial period, more
than half of the whole Taiwanese population were in agricultural sector. The labor
market in a traditional agricultural economy is quite different from that of a mod-
ern society, and so it is not clear if change of real wage in some sectors is a useful
indication of welfare change for the Taiwanese as a whole.11
Another approach to study the change of Taiwanese per capita income is to di-
rectly compute income distribution between Taiwanese and Japanese. There are at
least two works on this problem, and their conclusions are briefly discussed below.
Income Distribution of 1930 and 1940
Kimura (1989, 1997) directly estimated income distribution between Taiwanese and
Japanese in 1930 and 1940. The estimation was done on agriculture, manufacturing,
and service sectors, and in each sector, incomes of Taiwanese, Japanese, foreigner, and
government are computed. According to his estimation, Taiwanese share of national
income was 70.8% in 1930. The share slightly increased to 71.9% in 1940.
10See the survey by Ho (1984) and Chang and Yeh (2001).
11See Wu (2000) for a discussion on the related issues.
8
Table 3: Taiwanese Share in National Income
1912 1916 1917 1918 1919 1929 1938 1939 1940 1941
% 69.6 60.8 62.4 66.7 69.2 69.9 65.9 65.6 64.5 65.0
Sources: Yen (1997), p. 42. The original paper construct two series, reflecting two
assumptions about labor share in national income. This table shows only the series
that are closer to the estimates by Kimura (1997).
Time Series of Income Distribution
Yen (1997) was another study on income distribution during the colonial period. She
compiled four sets of data during different years that gave information on ownership
of capital. She also compiled the data that show percentage of Taiwanese and Japanese
labor during the colonial period. By assuming that capital and labor share were some
constants, it is then straightforward to compute Taiwanese share in national income
for each year when data of ownership of capital are available. Her estimates covered
10 years from 1912 to 1941, and the results are shown in Table 3.
One difficulty with Yen’s study is that it is impossible to check the consistency of
the four data sets used in her estimation. It turns out, however, that her results are
close to Kimura (1997). For example, Taiwanese share in national income in 1929
was 69.9% according to Yen’s study, while Kimura’s estimate of 1930 was 70.8%. Yen’s
estimate for 1940 was 64.5%, which was somewhat lower than 71.9% as estimated by
Kimura.
As shown in Table 1, Taiwan’s per capita GDP in 1938 was 1,236 dollars. In the
same year, the percentage of Taiwanese in total populationwas 93.8%. Using Kimura’s
estimate of income distribution in 1940, Taiwanese per capita income was 1011.8
dollars in 1938, which was 172% of China’s per capita GDP. This ratio shows clearly
the importance of economic growth. It is reasonable to assume that in 1895, Taiwan’s
per capita GDP would be the almost the same as China’s average. If Taiwan did not
become a colony of Japan, and continued to be a province of China, its per capita
GDP in 1938 might not be too different from 589 dollars. Instead, the successful
development efforts of the Japanese had transformed the economy, and significantly
increased the welfare of Taiwanese.
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3 Colonial Policies
The previous two sections show the economic changes in Taiwan during the Japanese
period. Ten years before the Japanese started to rule Taiwan, Governor Liu Ming-
chuan had tried to modernize Taiwan’s economy, when he was designated as the first
Governor of Taiwan province in 1885. Some of his policies were similar to those later
implemented by the Japanese colonial government.12 Unfortunately, many of the
policies failed to produce effects on the economy. It would be illuminating to com-
pare the self-strengthening program in late Ch’ing with the Japanese development
policies. If we can understand how the Japanese succeeded and why the Ch’ing gov-
ernment failed, we would have a better understanding of the mechanism of economic
development.
Bauer and Yamey (1957) and Bauer (1971) argued that the key to development
is not government plans, but to let market forces to work. As long as a favorable
environment was created for market forces to work, opportunities for profit would
induce private sector to work hard, and economy will develop. This does not mean,
however, that government should do nothing. On the contrary, whether development
will succeed depends crucially on if government has done its job right. Specifically,
the government shouldmaintain law and order, protect private property, enforce con-
tracts, organize basic transport and health services, and introduce modern financial
and legal institutions (Bauer, 1971, p. 149). In this section, a preliminary compari-
son of the self-strengthening program of late Ch’ing and the development efforts of
the Japanese colonial government suggests that Taiwan’s development experience is
consistent with the above argument.
3.1 Law, Order, and Property Right
During the Ch’ing rule, Taiwan was notorious for the frequency of uprisings, some
of them lasted for years. There were also frequent conflicts between the aborigines
living in the mountain area and the residents in the plains. The maintenance of law
and order did not seem to improve much during and after the self-strengthening
program in late Ch’ing. For example, in 1888 a severe rebellion had erupted in central
12For a discussion on the policies and efforts of LiuMing-ch’uan, see Speidel (1976) and Chu (1963).
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Taiwan, when Governor Liu Ming-ch’uan was engaged in land reform.13 When the
Japanese landed Taiwan in 1895, they did not expect that in the following years, they
would have faced so much strong resistance from local people. The Japanese colonial
government was able to maintain law and order for the most part of Taiwan only in
early 1900s.14
During Ch’ing rule, most of the land was owned by two owners, an absentee land-
lord and a resident landowner. The absentee landlord was responsible for paying the
land tax, and received rent from the resident landowner, and the latter owned the
right to sell or rent the land.15 It is well-known that a large portion of the cultivated
land was not registered, and no tax was paid for the land. Government officials were
aware of the fact, but preferred not to do anything on it. During the land reform in
1898–1904, all lands were registered, the absentee landlords were obliged to exchange
their rights for interest-bearing bonds, and the resident landowners were guaranteed
title to their property.16 The land reform clarified property rights, enhanced govern-
ment tax revenues, and made it easier for Japanese firms to purchase large amount of
lands in Taiwan.
Governor Liu Ming-ch’uan also attempted a land reform in 1886. The reform
can be regarded as successful in that land tax revenue was increased tremendously
However, although the land owners in northern Taiwan cooperated with the land
reform, the story was quite different in central and southern Taiwan where Liu had
less power. And it resulted in a uprising in central Taiwan in 1888.17 From the land
area statistics compiled later by the Japanese government, it is also clear that land
measurement and recording in Liu’s land reform were incomplete.
13See also Davidson (1903, pp. 245–46) for a description about how Governor Liu Ming-chuan
avoided visiting southern area of Taiwan due to the hostility arising from a tax increase. Davidson also
documented the horrible events how shipwrecks near the coast of Taiwan would be cruelly plundered
by local people.
14In 1901, when Taiwan Sugar Company built its first sugar plant in Kaoshiung, the plant was at-
tacked by local bandits. The sugar plant later had to be protected by resident policemen for some
time.
15A land reform at the end of the Ch’ing rule made resident landowner to be responsible for tax
payment. See Taiwan Private Law (1993), vol. 1, p. 179.
16In 1895, the official registered land area was 361,417 chias. After the Japanese finished a extensive
land survey in 1903, the land area increased to 534,157 chias.
17See Speidel (1976), p. 454, for a brief discussion.
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3.2 Government Investment
Before 1895, the island of Taiwan contained numerous isolated towns and villages
with almost no communication. These towns maintained closer trade ties with main-
land Chinese cities across the Strait than they did with each other. When rice was
harvested, hundreds of coolie were hired to transport bags of rice with their shoul-
ders and backs to the nearby market.18 Sugar transportation faced a similar difficulty.
To reduce transportation cost, most of the sugar factories were located on a riverside.
Upon arriving in Taiwan, the Japanese military at once set to road building. Tai-
wan’s first railway connecting Keelung and Hsinchu was built by the Ch’ing govern-
ment and completed in 1893. It turned out to be unusable, however, and was com-
pletely rebuilt by the Japanese. The big project of constructing the railway connect-
ing Keelung and Kaoshiung, sponsored by the colonial government, began in 1899
and was completed in 1907. Upon the completion of the railway, the transportation
system on the western coast changed immediately. Export products were first trans-
ported to either Keelung or Kaoshiung by railway, and then shipped by big steam
ships. The railway system was later extended to a round-the-island network.
Before 1895, different villages might use differentmeasurement systems andmetal
currencies. The Japanese government unified the measure system, and established the
Bank of Taiwan in 1899, which started issuing paper money, and also provided funds
for private and public investments.
Mizoguchi and Yu¯zo¯ (1984) compared Taiwan and Korea’s capital formation dur-
ing the colonial period, and found that Taiwan’s investment to GNE ratio was signif-
icantly higher than Korea. Figure 2 shows Taiwan’s investment to GNE ratio and
government investment share in total investment. In early colonial period, total in-
vestment to GNE ratio was low, but the government investment share in total invest-
ment was very high.19 This was the period when the colonial government was actively
engaged in infrastructure construction. In the 1910s, government investment share
in total investment declined, while total investment to GNE ratio gradually picked
up. This means that investment growth was higher than GNE growth, and private
18See Economic Survey Reports (1905) (1905), vol. 1, p. 33–34.
19Before 1903, the ratio was above 90%. We suspect that such an unimaginable figure was due to
the fact that the earlier statistics was not able to correctly compute all the private investment.
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Figure 2: Government Investment Share in Total Investment
Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988).
investment share was increasing. Figure 2 suggests that government investment in
infrastructure during the earlier colonial period has been successful in boosting up
private investment later.
The construction of big infrastructure projects required a lot of funds. Before
1904, the colonial government expenditures was heavily financed by direct budget
transfer from Japan’s central government. Direct budget transfer was terminated in
1904, but the colonial government continued to receive financial support up to early
1910s through the so-called “sugar consumption tax” transfer. The tax was supposed
to be collected by the central government, but was instead collected by the colonial
government. Without financial support from the central government, the colonial
government could also resort to debt financing for the infrastructure project.
As shown in Figure 3, however, until the end of 1900s domestic saving was lower
than domestic investment. This implied that if the government wanted to proceed
with the investment project, it had to borrow from outside Taiwan. For the colonial
government, this posed little difficulty because it could borrow in Japan’s financial
market. And in fact, the colonial government did issue short-term and long-term
public debt to finance various projects.
In contrast, Governor Liu Ming-chuan faced a much more difficult situation.
Although the Ch’ing empire gave extra fund to support Taiwan’s self-strengthening
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Figure 3: Saving and Investment to GNE ratio
Note: national saving was computed by summing up gross investment
and current account balance.
Source: current account balance, Yamamoto (1992); investment GNE,
Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988).
program, it was not enough to cover all the expenditures. During the Japanese period,
the colonial government could easily borrow in Japan’s financial market. But it is
doubtful that during late Ch’ing period, Taiwan was able to borrow from the China’s
financial market or even the international financial market, and we did not find such
a record. Facing the budget constraint, Governor Liu introduced a new tax on sugar
export, and received strong resistance especially in southern Taiwan.20
3.3 Rice and Sugar
Toward the end of Ch’ing rule, tea was themost important export fromTaiwan. In the
1900s, several big sugar companies were established in Taiwan, and the value of sugar
production quickly exceeded that of tea. In the mid-1920s, a new breed of rice, called
Ponlai, was developed. From then on, Ponlai rice and sugar were the two primary
exports.
The colonial government played an important role in the raising of Taiwan’s agri-
culture productivity. For example, chemical fertilizer was introduced to sugarcane
farmers in 1903 by a government institution, which also provided financial sup-
port. Both quality improvement of the traditional rice breed and the development
20See Davidson (1903), p. 245.
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Figure 4: Commodity export to GDP Ratio
Note: 1897–1948, export from Taiwan Trade Statistics for the Last Fifty
Three Years (1950). 1903–36, GDP from GNE estimate in Mizoguchi
and Umemura (1988); 1937–50, GDP from Kuo et al. (1997), For
1897–1902, GDP was estimated indirectly by assuming that annual
nominal GDP growth rate was 4.0%. After World War II, GDP esti-
mate from official national income statistics.
of the new Ponlai rice breed were conducted by government research institutes. The
Japanese organized farmers’ associations as an extension of colonial administration,
and to disseminate knowledge of improved farming methods.
The colonial government also sponsored irrigation projects. The most prominent
project was the Chia-nan irrigation system, located in Tainan. The project was spon-
sored mainly by the government, and constructed in the 1920s. Before the project,
paddy land area consisted of 35% of total cultivated land in Tainan. After the project
was completed, the ratio increased to 70% in 1937.21 The productivity of paddy land
was much higher than dry land, and the irrigation project greatly enhanced agricul-
tural production.
After 1895, Taiwan was an integral part of the Japanese empire, and most of its
exports were sold to Japan. As shown in Figure 4, the ratio of commodity exports to
GDP was about 15% in 1900, and it steadily increased to over 40% in 1940. During
World War II, the ratio declined to almost nothing, but rose again in the early 1950s.
21In 1920–40, Taiwan’s paddy land area increased by 167,482 chias, in which the increment in Tainan
area was 109,507 chias, or 65.4% of the total increase.
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4 Post-colonial Development
At the end of theWorldWar II, Taiwan was transferred to China. The Nationalist gov-
ernment decided that all the Japanese were required to leave Taiwan, and confiscated
all the Japanese properties left behind. From 1945 to 1949, Taiwan’s wholesale price
index rose by more than ten thousand times. Like any historical hyperinflation, infla-
tion was caused by unlimited money supply increase, and the money supply increase
was in turn due to the heavy economic control policy adopted by the Nationalist gov-
ernment.
4.1 U.S. Aid to Taiwan
The Nationalist government retreated to Taipei in December 1949, and the tension
across the Taiwan Strait reached a new height. In 1950, 90 percent of the central gov-
ernment budget was defense spending. The fate of Taiwan was permanently changed
when the KoreanWar broke out on June 25, 1950. The U.S. government immediately
decided to give economic and military aid to Taiwan.
The Nationalist government carried out a land reform in 1949–53. The first step
was to reduce all farm rent from an average of about 50% to a maximum of 37.5% of
the normal harvest value. In 1953, it was decreed that private owners had to sell all of
their lands over 3 hectares to the government. The lands were then sold to its tenants.
Government officials claimed that land reform had raised agricultural productivity,
but researchers have not found conclusive evidence. It is clear, however, that the
reform induced wealth redistribution because land owners were forced to sell their
lands at a price below the market level. Tenants undoubtedly were benefited from the
reform.
In 1951–65, U.S. economic aid to Taiwan totaled US$1.465 billion dollars. To
the U.S. government, the purpose of giving out foreign aid was for domestic security.
Hence in the beginning, the U.S. aid to Taiwan was designed to stabilize the economy
and to support U.S. security.22 In the second half of the 1950s, however, the focus
of the aid program gradually changed to economic development. During the 1950s,
the industrial sector was dominated by public enterprises taken over from Japanese
22See the discussion in Jacoby (1966), p. 31.
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Table 4: Components of GDP
1951 1971 1981 1990 2000
Agriculture 32.3% 13.1% 7.3% 4.2% 2.1%
Industry 21.3% 38.9% 45.5% 41.2% 32.4%
Service 46.4% 48.0% 47.2% 54.6% 65.5%
companies, and the Nationalist government emphasized regulation and control in its
economic policy. The final phase of the aid program specifically encouraged the de-
velopment of private enterprises and promoted the notion of the market mechanism.
This had helped to change Taiwan into a more market-oriented economy.23
4.2 Fast Growth
In 1960–99, Taiwan’s average per capita real GDP growth was 6.19%, which is the
second highest in a data set with 53 countries.24 The average growth rate for the 53
countries was 2.04%. In other words, Taiwan’s per capita real GDP rose by 10 times
from 1960 to 1999. Fast growth is accompanied by dramatic change in industrial
structures. As shown in Table 4, The ratio of value-added of Agriculture to GDP
declined from 32.3% in 1951 to 2.1% in 2000. The ratio of Industry increased from
21.3% in 1951, to 45.5% in 1981, and then decreased to 32.4% in 2000.
It has been argued that the GDP growth during the post-War period was due to
quick accumulation of fixed capital and a quick increase in labor input.25 An im-
portant contribution to labor input increase was that more women entered the labor
market. The female labor participation rate was 35.4% in 1971, and in the year 2000 it
rose to 46.0%. With the increase in labor and capital inputs found to be the reason for
high economic growth, the next question is why labor and capital inputs increased at
such a high rate? Several arguments have been proposed.26 Many people emphasize
that export-orientation and human capital accumulation are important. Some have
argued that the government plays a critical role, and industrial policies have been ef-
23See Jacoby (1966), p. 34, 129–49.
24The highest is South Korea. The data include almost all the countries that GDP estimates are avail-
able during the period. Data source are Penn World Table 5.6., from http://www.worldbank.
org/research/growth.
25See, e.g., Young (1994).
26Kuznets (1979) tries to explain why the growth rate was high in the 1950s.
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fective. On the other hand, there are arguments that the high growth rate is due not
to government intervention, but to the market-oriented, competitive environment.
To most economists, the growth miracle remains an puzzle.
Taiwan’s per capita GDP was about 15% of the U.S. in 1905. The ratio tumbled
during World War II, and the immigration of about one million people from the
mainland in 1949 also lowered the ratio. The per capita GDP ratio to the U.S. was
12.7% in 1960. But due to the high growth rate, it rose to 60% in 1999. Economic
growth brings welfare improvement. A useful indicator is longer life expectancy.
From Table 2 above, life expectancy for males in 1956 was 60.2 years, and for female,
64.2 years . In 1999, this has been extended to 72.6 years and 78.3 years, respectively.
5 Pre-colonial Stagnation of Korea
The four sections above discuss Taiwan’s development under the Japanese colonial
government. We now turn our attention to the development of Korea. We begin by
presenting evidence showing long term deterioration in living standards before 1900.
Shocks are then identified to account for the subsequent recovery.
Plotting real wages and rents observed in different rural areas over different pe-
riods, one is conveyed the impression that factor incomes fell as a matter of trend
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Figures 5 and 6). This may be illu-
sory, rather than real, given the limited number of time series data available and the
low level of factor market integration, which implies factor prices were to a significant
extent affected by regional shocks.
Additional evidence exists to confirm real wages and rents did fall over the two
centuries however. Real paddy field price (nominal paddy field price divided by rice
price) fell during the eighteenth (Figure 7). Real slave price (nominal slave price
deflated by rice price) fell until the early nineteenth century, when the dynastic gov-
ernment emancipated public slaves, dealing a major blow to slavery and shooting up
slave prices. From the raised level, slave prices resumed to fall during the rest of the
nineteenth century (Figure 8).
The simultaneous decline in the two key factor prices in traditional Korea indi-
cates falling marginal productivity of land and labor, which in turn implies declining
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Figure 7: Rice Wages in Korea (toe per day)
Source: 1) two different eighteenth and nineteenth century rice
wage series for construction worker calculated using data from
Yoon (1998);
2) rice wages paid by a landholding family in southeastern Ko-
rea from 1853 to 1910 compiled by Lee (2001);
3) rice wages calculated using nominal agricultural wage data
compiled by Odaka (1988);
4) post-WWII South Korean wage series was obtained from
Hwang (1996).
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level of total factor productivity. Three pieces of evidence point to rice growing sector
as the origin of the productivity regress. Production was being diversified out of rice
towards dry farming and non-agricultural activities. Second, rice prices rose relatively
to dry farm product prices. Finally, dry farm prices in terms of amount rice remained
stable over the two centuries.
Rice farming productivity fell, because irrigation system decayed. The number of
working reservoirs suffered sustained decrease, because reservoirs were often left un-
repaired after flood damages. In the early dynastic period, the required repair work
used to be carried out by corvee mobilized through bureaucratic system of control,
which virtually collapsed in the wake of the seventeenth century wars with Japan and
China. Not only was the pre-1600 regime never fully restored, but also the central
control was further undermined during the nineteenth century, when several power-
ful landowning families took turns to control monarchs for private interests.
6 Transition toModern Economic Growth
Wages and rents started to rebound from around 1900 (Figures 5 and 6), as new types
of rice seed varieties and farming technology were brought into Korea by immigrants
from Japan. The number of Japanese immigrants surged, as Japan defeated China and
Russia in the scramble for Korea in 1894 and 1905, respectively, and finally annexed
Korea as a part of its empire. The upturn in living standards was sustained and ac-
celerated by the Rice Production Development Program (1920–33), launched by the
colonial government in response to the Rice Riot of 1918. Themost important contri-
bution of the Program was to expand irrigation, which was supplemented by further
diffusion of new rice seed varieties and increased use of chemical fertilizer. Rents rose
far more rapidly than wages in colonial Korea, as labor supply expanded quickly with
falling mortality causing population explosion. Mortality declined, because the colo-
nial government promoted health campaign and introduced modern medical tech-
nology. While population grew rapidly in colonial Korea, per capita output rose, with
income distribution becoming increasingly unequal. Modern economic growth was
in progress in colonial Korea.
The Rice Program was only a part of broader scheme of developmental policy
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Table 5: Growth Accounting for Colonial Korea, 1918/20–35/7
growth rates factor shares contribution to growth
output 2.8%
labor 1.4% 0.63 1.4% ∗ 0.63 = 0.88%
capital 4.8% 0.31 4.8% ∗ 0.31 = 1.49%
land 0.2% 0.06 0.2% ∗ 0.06 = 0.01%
TFP 2.8% − 0.88% − 1.49% − 0.01% = 0.42%
Notes: growth rates were calculated using three year averages.
Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988). Mizoguchi’s capital stock series
was corrected for geographical undercoverage.
supporting the modern economic growth. The cadastral survey of the 1910s mod-
ernized system of land property rights in Korea. An extensive network of transporta-
tion and communicationwas built, leading to rapid integration of regional market for
commodities and productive factors. Modern schools were built to replace traditional
schools teaching Chinese classics. These projects caused expansion of public spend-
ing, which were financed partly by raising tax rates, but more importantly by transfer
from the Japanese government. One remaining element of the colonial growth was
the industrialization during the 1930s, which was partly spillover from Japan’s early
and vigorous recovery from the Great Depression and partly promoted as preparation
for invasion into China.
Growth accounting results indicate the colonial growth was drivenmainly by cap-
ital accumulation. Table 5 shows that around 85% of the colonial growth was due to
increased use of labor and capital, and capital accumulation contributed to the colo-
nial growth more than three times as much as productivity advance. Sectoral growth
accounting assigns an even greater role for capital accumulation. Ban (1979, pp. 101–
3) shows that total factor productivity in agriculture declined 0.7% per year from
1920–30 to be followed by a decade of improvement at the annual rate of 0.77%. The
consequence was that the level of agricultural productivity on the eve of WWII did
not differ significantly from that at the beginning of the Rice Program was launched.
Kang and Ramachandran (1999) found a somewhat larger role for productivity
growth in southern Korean agriculture, producing a large majority of the colonial
rural output: total factor productivity grew 0.3% per year from 1919–27 (explain-
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Table 6: Growth Accounting for Non-agriculture, 1918/20–35/7
growth rates factor shares contribution to growth
output 6.0%
labor 3.3% 0.55 3.3% ∗ 0.55 = 1.8%
capital 8.3% 0.45 8.3% ∗ 0.45 = 3.7%
TFP 6.0% − 1.8% − 3.7% = 0.5%
Notes: growth rates were calculated using three-year averages.
Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988).
ing 23.1% of the agricultural growth) and 0.5% per year from 1928–37 (explaining
11.5% of the agricultural growth). Both calculations however found 1) that increased
capital input, chemical fertilizer in particular, the dominant factor accounting for the
agricultural growth in colonial Korea, and 2) that productivity advance was faster in
the 1930s than in the preceding decade. In non-agriculture, capital accumulation
explained 3.7% of the 6.0% annual growth of non-agricultural value added output,
which compares with the 0.5% contributionmade by productivity advance (Table 6).
The rapid capital accumulation was financed to a great extent by capital imports
from Japan. Colonial Korea’s trade was predominantly with Japan, and the trade gen-
erated substantial amount of current account deficits. Table 7 shows that the current
account deficits (foreign savings) accounted for 41% of gross fixed capital formation
from 1919–38. Another important feature of the capital formation in interwar Ko-
rea was that more than 63% (= 54% + 9%) of the investment was carried out by
the colonial government. To build railways, roads, and harbors, the colonial govern-
ment introduced new taxes and raised existing taxes throughout the colonial period.
Had the government not taken an increasing portion of incomes, individuals would
have saved larger shares of their incomes. However, given the low level of income
in colonial Korea, the hypothetical increase in the private savings ratio is likely to
have been modest and substantially smaller than the saving imposed by the colonial
government. The forced savings however was not large enough to finance planned
investment projects. Thus the colonial government was driven to rely on the unilat-
eral transfer from the Japanese government and to raise debts in the Japanese capital
market. The unilateral transfer accounted for 9% of the interwar capital formation
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Table 7: Financing the Capital Formation in Korea, 1919–38 (%)
Domestic Foreign
Private Public Private Public
5% 54% 32% 9%
Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988).
(22% of capital inflows) from 1919–38. Domestic private savings accounted for only
5% of the capital formation in interwar Korea.
All in all, the transition tomodern economic growth in interwar Korea was achieved
almost entirely by the colonial government. Not only did it play an important role in
raising agricultural productivity by implementing the Rice Development Program,
but also it accounted for almost two thirds of capital formation, which was the driv-
ing force for non-agricultural output growth.
7 Post-colonial Growth
A series of sizable political shocks buffeted the Korean peninsula in the 1940s and
1950s, which included the Second World War, independence, political division, and
the Korean War. But much of the colonial capital stock and technology survived
these shocks to become the basis for the post-1960 development in the two Koreas.
For instance, Ban’s (1974) estimate indicates that although the Korean War damaged
many houses, factories, and social infrastructure, much of the irrigation and other
production facilities in the countryside survived the hostilities: the South Korean
agricultural capital stock estimated at 1934 prices was 32 million yen in 1938, which
fell to 31 million yen in 1954. Agricultural productivity had ups and downs during
the turbulent years from the outbreak of WWII and the conclusion of the Korean
War, but the level of total factor productivity in 1953 was roughly the same as that in
1938 (Ban, 1979, p. 102).
On the top of capital and technology, South Korea took over the institutions set
up by the colonial rulers, which went far to determine the nature and pace of the
economic growth in South Korea. South Korea’s system of modern land property
right has its origins in the Cadastral Survey carried out during the first decade of the
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colonial rule. It was after 1910 that regional commodity and labor markets became
integrated, which reduced price and wage differentials to levels roughly equal to those
observed in present-day South Korea (Cha, 2000). Japanese rulers allowed or even
encouraged Korean entrepreneurship (Eckert (19??) and McNamara (19??)). Park
(1999) has found that modern factory labor force has first emerged in colonial Korea.
One particularly important institution South Korea inherited was the develop-
mental state. As was the case with the colonial growth, the South Korean growth
was powered mainly by capital accumulation, which was accelerated by public policy
(Kim and Lau, 1994; Young, 1994). In both colonial and South Korea, the government
could do four things to raise the aggregate savings ratio. First, it could force people
to save more by raising tax ratio and then using the increased tax revenue to finance
public investment. Cha (1998) has shown that the increasingly heavier taxation had
beneficial effect upon growth in colonial growth by promoting capital accumulation.
Table 8 shows that during the first decade of the high growth South Korean govern-
ment accounted for as much as 26% of capital formation out of tax revenue, a ratio
only about half of that for the interwar period, but still high compared to other de-
veloping countries. Second, the strong state could tap foreign savings by ensuring
political stability. Since Korea was forced open to international trade in 1876, capi-
tal inflows remained modest to surge in 1905, when the Japanese victory over Russia
assure the Japanese supremacy over Korea, removing the political risk Japanese in-
vestors could incur by investing in Korea. Similarly, once the military government
were recognized as durable and its developmental policies as sustainable, foreign cap-
ital flows into South Korea began to rise rapidly (Woo (1991, 84, 100)). Third, the
state promoted capital accumulation by securing public transfer. The colonial gov-
ernment, an autonomous entity accountable neither to the cabinet nor to the parlia-
ment in Tokyo, lobbied the Japanese government for funds to finance development
projects in colonial Korea.
As the aid from the U.S. declined in the early 1960s, the South Korean government
normalized diplomatic relations in 1965 with Japan in return for substantial amount
of “reparation” payment. The Vietnam War provided an unexpected and precious
opportunity for the South Korean government to reverse the declining transfer from
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Table 8: Sources of Finance in South Korean Capital Formation, 1962–80 (%)
1962–70
Domestic
Private Public Foreign
46% 26% 28%
1971–80
Domestic
Private Public Foreign
66% 15% 19%
Source: Bank of Korea.
the U.S. Finally, the government implemented policy measures to increase private
foreign capital inflows. Both in the 1930s and after 1960, the government offered tax
and other incentives etc in 1930s to attract foreign direct investment. And the South
Korean government accelerated capital inflows by issuing guarantees on foreign debt
contracted by private firms. Finally, the government promoted export industries,
as booming exports would facilitate foreign borrowing by reducing the chances of
defaulting on debts.
8 Concluding Remarks
In the history of world’s economic development, some economy develops earlier,
some later. Even today, there are countries whose people are living near subsistence
level. For most of the countries, the transformation from a stagnant economy into
a growing economy is a gradual and long process. In longer period of time many
things would change, and this makes it more difficult to identify those elements that
are most important for economic development. It this paper, we argue that the eco-
nomic development of Taiwan and Korea during the early 20th century are special in
that its economic transformation were accomplished within a relatively short period
of time. The Japanese colonial governments had published extensive statistical data to
document the economic development of Taiwan and Korea. All these had made Tai-
wan and Korea as two valuable cases for understanding the mechanism of economic
26
development.
In this paper, we use national income and other statistics to document the eco-
nomic development of Taiwan and Korea. We argue that the Japanese colonial ad-
ministrations had implemented successful development policies. From various in-
dicators, Taiwan’s development during the Japanese era was probably more success-
ful than Korea. In the case of Taiwan, why the Japanese succeeded and Governor
Liu Ming-chuan failed? Why Taiwan’s development was relatively better than Korea?
These are important questions deserving further studies.
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